Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1986

Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the
Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte. Supreme Court Case Files Collection.
Box 139. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

t},t-J)-

/22/86

(~~

~b-j

/(.{) ~ ~

~~

'I· c ~ ,.~

~~~

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 31, 1986 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
Cal.

No. 86-421-ASX
Board of Directors
International,
t
pelled chapter
ted women)

v.

Ct.
App.
Shimer)

I

a

ok_

Rotary Club of Duarte, ~.
(chapter seeking to~ t
women)

1.

State/Civil

Timely

SUMMARY:

A California statute prohibits discrimi-

nation against women.

The lower court construed this statute to

prevent appellant from restricting its membership to males only.

No. 86-421-ASX
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The question presented is whether this statute impermissibly in-

-

- ------·

fringes on the the 1st amendment right of association .

-----------.......-------- ------------2.
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:
Rotary

.....

clubs

are non-

profit organizations composed of business and professional men.
Their purpose is to "provide humanitarian service, encourage high
ethical standards
peace throughout

in all vocations,
the world."

and help build goodwill and

Petn Appx

at C-5.

Appellee is a

21-member Rotary club located in Duarte, California.

Each local

club is a member of appellant Rotary International ("International"),

the organization that promotes and supervises the various

clubs.

Individual members belong to the local club,

ternational.

At

not to In-

the time of this action there were over 19,000

clubs, with a combined membership of over 900,000 men.
In 1977, the Duarte club admitted 3 women as members, in
direct contravention of
by International.

the constitution and bylaws established

After notice and a hearing,

International re-

voked Duarte's charter and terminated its membership in International.

Duarte and

2 of

the women sued,

claiming,

inter alia,

that International had violated the California public accommodations

statute,

("Unruh").
entitled
ties,

to

better

known

as

the

Unruh

Civil

Rights

Act

That statute provides that people of either sex "are
full

privileges,

and

equal

accommodations,

or services

every kind whatsoever."

advantages,

facili-

in all business establishments of

See Appx

at A-4.

The complaint asked

that International be enjoined from enforcing its rules that restrict membership in local clubs to men, and that Duarte be rein'-

stated as a member club.

No. 86-421-ASX
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The tc denied the requests for relief, finding that International and Duarte are not "business establishments" within
the meaning of Unruh because they did not provide goods or services to its members.

The· tc also found that unless International

was allowed to enforce its male-only membership rule, the associ-

.

--··-·---

ational rights of many individual Rotarians would be violated.
--···-·· -·~-

---------·----

.

On the other hand, the tc concluded that the enforcement of the
membership policy would not damage Duarte,
the individual plain,..
tiffs, or women in general.
The Cal.

Ct.

of App.

reversed.

The court first held

.
that the both Duarte and International were (/bus1ness
est.a bl'1s h v\

ments, and therefore were prohibited from discriminating against
women in its membership policies.

The court found that Interna-

tional had sufficient "business attributes" to come with in the
terms of the statute, and that "business concerns are a motivating factor

in joining local clubs."

Id.,

at C-26.

The court

rejected the argument that the clubs did not provide goods and
services to their members, noting that Rotarians receive an organizational magazine and

.
other

publications, plus are allowed to

attend Rotary business conferences, where they learn management
techniques and other professional skills.
Second,

the

court

ruled

that

admitting women

to

the

local clubs would not cause irreparable harm to International or
to individual ~otarians.

The court acknowledge~ that the member~

ship policy had widespread support within the organization, and
that the efficient operation of the clubs depended on agreement
~

and cooperation.

But there was little evidence, said the court,

;7
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that the admission of women would interfere significantly with
Duarte's or International's goals.
Finally,

the state court

rejected

the claim that

the

forced admission of women would violate the constitutional right
of free

association.

The

United States Jaycees,
Minnesota

468

court

relied

heavily on Roberts v.

u.s. 609 (1984), which held that a

anti-discrimination

statute did

not

amendment by forcing the Jaycees to admit women.

violate

the 1st

In Roberts this

Court found that the right of intimate association applied with
particular force

to certain types of organizations:

those that

are small, that share a common purpose and policy, that are selective, and that are "seclu[ded] from others in critical aspects
of the relationship."

Id., at 620.

This Court found, however,

that the Jaycees were not entitled to 1st amendment protections
against state discrimination laws, because that organization did
not

demonstrate

the

among its members.

necessary

degree

of

intimate

affiliation

The Court noted that membership in the local

Jaycee chapters was both large and non-selective, and that numerous non-members of both sexes often participated in the group's
activities.

Id., at 621.

The Cal. App. Ct. found that the Rotary organization was
similar enough to the Jaycees to compel the same result.

The

court conceded that membership in the local clubs was selective,
and that fellowship was a shared goal of the members.

But it

concluded that several other factors demonstrated a lack of intimate affiliation.

First, "the immense size of International and

the number of Rotarians throughout the world is hardly indicative

No. 86-421-ASX
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of an intimate relationship."

Appx at C-35.

Second, the court

pointed out that despite the fraternal nature of the clubs, business benefits and commercial advantages were strong inducements
for most members to join.

Third, the court noted that each local

organization was required to allow member from any other chapter
to attend

its meetings,

thus encouraging "worldwide" congenial-

ity.
The appeals court therefore ordered that International
be enjoined from enforcing

its membership pol icy.

The Cal.

S.

Ct. denied a petition for review.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

International's first claim is

that

the Rotary organization is not like the Jaycees, and that accordingly Roberts
case

found,

is

distinguishable.

the Jaycees

had

a

As

the

lower

court

in that

non-selective membership policy

that encouraged people to join in order to enhance their commercial interests.

Rotarians,

however,

have been discouraged from

using their club membership for commercial gain, or from giving
preferential

business

treatment

to other members.

The Jaycees

encouraged women and other non-members from participating in its
activities;

Rotary clubs have well-defined policies restricting

most of its activities to its members.
In addition,
selective.
sional,

membership

in a Rotary chapter

is highly

Members must be a business leader or other profes-

and must be of good moral character.

With a few excep-

tions, only 1 representative of each occupation is permitted per
chapter.

This means that although there are a large number of

clubs, the average membership in each club is fewer than 50.

The
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men in these small groups are united by a common interest in community service and fellowship, thus demonstrating a shared, personal goal

that

the Court

found

significant

in Roberts.

The

local clubs also are "secluded" from others, in that their meetings are open to members only.

All of these characteristics show

that Rotary clubs should be given full constitutional protections
for

their right to associate with others,

free

from the state

requirement that it accept people other than those chosen by the
members.
This case presents a critical issue that affects members
of private organizations everywhere.

The Court has the opportu-

nity to define the scope of Roberts, and to make it clear that
the right of intimate association is not as narrow as the decision below suggests.

The issue

is presented by way of appeal

rather than a petition for cert, because International has challenged the constitutionality of Unruh,

and the state court re-

solved the challenge in favor of the statute's validity.

See 28

u.s.c. §1257 (2).
International's second claim is that the lower court's
interpretation of Unruh is both overbroad and unconstitutionally
vague.

While the statute seems clear on its face, the California

courts have given Unruh such confusing and inconsistent interpretations that it is impossible to know what actions are included
within its reach.

For example, it has been held not discrimina-

tory to exclude all but the elderly from certain types of housing, but has been found impermissible to exclude families with
children from other rental facilities.

See Juris. Stat. at 25.

No. 86-421-ASX
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The court in this case has drawn such an arbitrary line that International could not have known in advance that its conduct was
prohibited.
Appellee: There is no reason for the Court to hear this
case.

First,

this is not an appeal because International does

not draw into question the validity of Unruh.

The claim below

was that International's 1st amendment rights prevented the court
from applying

the

state statute

in that particular

situation.

There was no allegation that Unruh itself is unconstitutional.
The claim thus should be treated as a petition for certiorari.
Cert is not warranted in this case, because the state
court correctly found

that

the Rotary organization was enough

like the Jaycees to be covered by Roberts.
a

small,

intimate organization,

it

is

International is not

a worldwide network of

nearly 20,000 clubs that consist of nearly one million members.
The Jaycees, by contrast had only 7,400 chapters and 300,000 members.

Nor are the Rotary clubs "secluded" in any sense; most of

the activities are done in public, and the organization goes to
great

lengths

to

publicize

and

promote

its existence and

its

work.
Like the Jaycees, Rotary Clubs attract members that seek
business opportunities and commercial advantages.

Most Rotarians

have their dues paid by their company or employer, and this payment is tax-deductable as a business expense.

Moreover, one of

the benefits of membership is the right to at tend professional
seminars to improve business skills.

No. 86-421-ASX
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Therefore, this case is virtually identical to Roberts,
making that decision dispositive.

The lower court correctly ap-

plied the law and reached a reasonable result.

There is no sub-

stantial federal issue presented.
4.

DISCUSSION:

There is an important threshold ques-

tion of whether this case should be treated as an appeal or as a
petition for cert.

Stern & Gressman offer the following guidance

[I]t is necessary for appeal purposes that the litigant
make specific and plain in the state court his contention that the application of the statute to his particular circumstance would make the statute void under
federal law.
If he chooses not to phrase his claim in
that manner but argues instead that his federal rights
prevent the application of the state statute to him, an
adverse decision amounts to a denial of his assertion
of federal rights rather than a validation of the state
statute, and review can be had •.. only via certiorari.
Supreme Court Practice at 113.
Although

I

am

somewhat

unclear

about

the distinction

being drawn, I think that the filings in this case are best characterized as a cert petition.
~

It does not appear from the opin-

ion below that International specifically challenged the constitutional i ty of Unruh.
International

argued

In its brief before the Cal. App. Ct. ,
that

the

"Injunctive Relief Sought Would

Violate Rotary's ••. Freedom of Association."
miss at 7.
of

See Motion to Dis-

The decision below thus seems to rest on the "denial

[International's]

assertion

of

federal

rights,"

since

the

court held that International is not entitled to associational
protections.

The state court did not concluded that the statute

was valid despite the existence of International's 1st amendment
rights.

Because of

this,

and

because appellant did not make

"specific and plain" his claim that Unruh was unconstitutional, I

No. 86-421-ASX
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tentatively recommend that the appeal be dismissed and the Court
treat the jurisdictional statement as a petition for cert.
No matter how the case is viewed, it presents an important federal

issue.

Nevertheless,

should

the Court decide

~

consider the p&pers as a cert petition, I recommend denial.

to

Rob-

erts was decided in July 1984, and the decision has not had time
to develop in the lower courts.
be a conflict over
highest

the

As yet there does not appear to

scope or meaning of Roberts among the

state courts or among federal courts.

prefer

to wait

(e.g.,

Kiwanis and Lions Club,

more fully.

until other decisions

Moreover,

This Court may

involving similar groups

amici here)

present the issues

based on the information presented,

the

decision below was not unreasonable.
The claim that Unruh
present a certworthy issue.
are meritless.

is vague and overbroad does not

First, it appears that the arguments

The treatment of Unruh in the California courts

is not so irrational as to raise a constitutional issue.

Second,

this issue was not raised at trial or on direct appeal, it only
arose in the petition for

rehearing.

At that point the state

court was not obligated to consider the matter, and apparently
did not do so.

This Court similarly should refuse to hear the

claim.
If

this

is

an appeal,

however,

I

recommend

that

the

Court postpone consideration of jurisdiction to a hearing on the
merits.

Although it appears doubtful that Rotary is different

enough from the Jaycees to distinguish this case from Roberts, it
would be difficult to summarily affirm based on the information

No. 86-421-ASX
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International has alleged that its clubs are

before the Court.

more selective and more intimate than the Jaycees,

factors that

the Court recognized as important in defining the rights of association.

I

would

be

uncomfortable making

factual

distinctions

between the organizations on the basis of the papers filed.
5.
dismissed,

RECOMMENDATION:
that

the

papers

I
be

recommend
treated

as

that
a

the

appeal

cert petition,

be
and

that cert be denied.
There is a response and 4 amicus briefs.
October 22, 1986
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Board of Directors of Rotary International
v. Rotary Club of Duarte et al

MEMO TO FILE:
I

have

Superior

now

Court

read

the

(making

opinions

detailed

of

the

findings

of

California
fact

and

ruling in favor of Rotary International), and the opinion
of the California Court of Appeals reversing the Superior
Court.
The question as to which I particularly would like my
clerk's view is whether we have juris diction over this
appeal.
posture.
having

We "postponed".

The case is in rather a curious

The appellee, a local rotary club in Duarte, was
membership

problems

and

invited women to

join.

This violated the by-laws of Rotary International,
the

Duarte

International.

club's

charter

was

revoked

by

and

Rotary

The Duarte Club then brought this law suit

on behalf of itself and three women.

Its complaint, on

its face, appear to rely on California law.

The superior

Court stated that the "heart of the dispute" arises under
the Unruh Act, and that the issue under that Act "whether
Rotary is a 'business establishment'".

2.

The basic position of appellants is that Rotary is a
"private"

type

of

constitutional
Amendment.
briefs,

"right

establishment"

that

that

and

all

of

is

is

members
under

the

law

controlled

and
by

have

the

"1 iberal

essentially

California

case

its

association"

Rotary

under

this

and

of

Appellees,

insists

therefore

club,

in

our

a

a

First
amici

"business
fact,

and

decision

in

Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
But before we reach the merits, there is a question as noted above It

whether we have appellant jurisdiction.

is not entirely easy

decided.

The

final

to know

paragraph

exactly what issue was

in

the

Court

of

Appeals

opinion is helpful in this respect:
"The matter is remanded to the Trial Court
with directions to enter a new and different
judgment in favor of Rotary Club of Duarte
mandating the Board of Directors of Rotary
International • • • to reinstate Rotary Club of
Duarte's charter thereby reinstating it as a
member
of
Rotary
International
and
permanently enjoining Rotary International
from enforcing or attempting to enforce its male
only membership restriction against Rotary Club
of Duarte."
Although the complaint does not appear to be grounded
on

the

federal

federal

constitution,

constitutional

cases.

the

opinions

below

cite

The briefs of the parties

3.

rely primarily on our constitutional decisions such as the
Jaycee case, King & Spalding, Alabama v. NAACP, and Moose
Lodge, (Douglas' dissent).

*
I

*

*

would like a brief and summary-type memo from my

clerk on both the jurisdiction and the merits issue.
LFP, JR.

ral 03/20/87
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VL~~
March 20, 1987

No. 86-421, Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte

Appeal from Cal. Ct. App. (Woods, PJ, McClosky, Shimer, JJ.}
To be argued Monday, March 30, 1987 (4th case}

Questions Presented
1. Does the First Amendment afford Rotary Clubs and their
members a right to exclude women?

2.

2.

Is the California Unruh. Civil Rights Act,

interpreted

to

require

admission

of

women

to

that has been
Rotary

Clubs,

unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?

I. BACKGROUND
A.
19,788

Rotary

Clubs.

In

local

Rotary

Clubs

about

907,750.

membership of
clubs.)
every

1982

Rotary

in

157

International

countries,

comprised

with

a

total

(There are now more than 21,000

Rotary International seeks to organize a Rotary Club in
community,

and to include

in each club a

representative

from each profession, business, and institution in the community.
An

11

average" Rotary Club had 46 members in 1982,

have fewer

than 20

members and a

although some

few have more than 900.

individual member belongs only to a local club.

In turn,

An

every

local club is a member of Rotary International.
Under the standard Rotary
Procedure,

membership

is

Club Constitution and Manual of

limited

to

"classification system, '1 members must
"leadership capacity ..

in a business,

men.

Under

the

Rotary

be actively engaged
profession,

or craft.

in a
The

basic rule is that only one representative of a given profession,
business or craft may be admitted to membership in a local club.
But

••professions" may be divided and subdivided (e.g.,

a single

club may admit a criminal lawyer, a probate lawyer, a tax lawyer,
etc.).

Moreover,

there is no limit to the number of clergymen

and journalists that may be admitted.
the general public,

Meetings are not open to

but the clubs publicize their activities by

3.

hanging signs on the roadside,

inviting guests to meetings, and

seeking to have meetings reported in newspapers.
Rotary

International

new members,

recommends a procedure for admitting

but the local clubs are not obliged to follow it.

Under the recommended procedure, a candidate's name is proposed
by

the

membership

committee

or

an

individual

member.

A

classification committee determines whether the candidate's work
fits

an

open

membership

(i.e. ,

committee

unrepresented)
evaluates

class if ica tion,

the

candidate's

while

the

character,

business and social standing, and "general eligibility.

u

If any

member objects to admitting a candidate, the admission decision
is made by a vote of the club's board of directors.

Membership

in a Rotary Club is personal, and cannot be transferred from one
club to another.

But members of any local club are entitled to

guest privileges at any other local club.

Moreover, many members

deduct their club dues as business expenses.
Local clubs meet once a week to engage in fellowship and to
plan community service projects.

In the early days of the Rotary

Clubs, members were encouraged to derive business advantages from
the

clubs.

abandoned

But
this

the

trial

approach:

court
'4 For

found
many

that

years

Rotary
the

long

ago

official

and

genuine policy of Rotary International has been to discourage the
seeking or giving of preferential business custom among Rotarians
or the use of Rotarian membership for commercial gain. '1

J.

s.

App. B-3.
Rotary asserts that its men-only policy is valuable because
of

the

"quality

of

fellowship

and

camaraderie"

in the local

4.

clubs,

and because it permits Rotary International

Hto operate

effectively over a worldwide base of varied cultures and social
mores.H

Blue brf. 10.

1972, 1977, and 1980.
of the vote.)
Interact
Rotary

or

Proposals to admit women were defeated in
{In 1980, the proposal received 40 percent

women are allowed to attend meetings, and may join
Rotaract,

International

auxiliaries,

both

sponsored

encourages

by

local

Rotary

clubs

International.

to

form

women•s

and authorizes the members of these groups to wear

the Rotary lapel pin.
B.

This case.

In 1977

the Duarte Rotary Club admitted 3

women members because it was having trouble recruiting men with
standing

in the

community.

As

a

result,

Rotary

International

revoked the Duarte Club•s membership in the International.
Duarte
relief

Club and
in

the

the 3 women sought declaratory and
California

courts.

They

alleged

The

injunctive

that

Rotary

International had violated California•s Unruh Civil Rights Act of
1959, which provides in part:
uAll persons within the jurisdiction of this state
are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race,
color,
religion,
ancestry,
or national origin are
entitled
to
the
full
and
equal
accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.u Cal.
Civ. Code §51.
The

trial

court

denied

relief.

It

held

International nor the Duarte Club is a
within the meaning of the Unruh Act.
both

Rotary

associations,

International
because

and

Rotary

the

that

neither

Rotary

"business establishment u

The Cal. Ct. App. held that
Duarte

International

Club
has

are

business

''significant

\

5.

business-! ike attributes," and because the Duarte Club provides
significant business advantages for its members.

II. DISCUSSION
This case is a sequel to Roberts v. United states Jaycees,
46i

u.s.

609

challenge

a

(1984),
Minnesota

which

upheld

public

against

constitutional

accommodations

law

interpreted to require the Jaycees to admit women.
are

somewhat

more

selective

than

whether
A.

was

Rotary clubs

Jaycees.

The

issue

is

difference.
Is

this a

Although

question is rather
not
a
r=

the

that

proper
appeal
,_
,_.,

the

jurisdictional

am inclined to think this is
un er 28

u. S.C.

§1257 (2),

which of course

requires the appellant to have "drawn in question the validity of
a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to
....,..,.,

the

Constitution."

Stern

and

Gressman

state

the

applicable

principle as follows:
"[I]t is necessary for appeal purposes that the
litigant make specific and plain i~~tat~~~urt his
contention that the aQQlication of tne~ to his
particular circumstances would make the statute void
under federal law.
If he choo~es not~ his
claim in that manner but arg~es instead th~t his
federal ri hts revent a Plication of th state statute
to him, an a verse dec1sio amounts to a den1al o his
a~rtion of federal rights rather than a validation of
the state statute, and review can be had in the Supreme
11
Court only via certiorari
Stern, Gressman &
Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 113 (6th ed. 1986).
This

principle

Newspapers,
Kulko v.

Inc.

has
v.

been

affirmed

Virginia,

448

California Superior Court,

in

cases

u.s.

555,

436 u.s.

such
562,

as
n.

Richmond
4

( 1980);

u.s. 84, 90, n. 4

6.

(1978):

and

Hanson

The

(1958).

v.

Denckla,

distinction

is

357

u.s.

235,

open

to

perhaps

244,

and

question

n.

on

4
the

ground that it depends almost entirely on the way in which the
appellant

frames

the

In

issues.

any

event,

it

is

well

established.
In this case,
drawn

Rotary International does not appear to have

in question the validity

of

the Unruh

excerpts
First,
to

Act.

The

record

aemonstrate this.

the Cal. Ct. App. held that

International

does

not

expressive association ...

11

application of the Unruh Act

abridge

its

Blue brf.

4,

freedom

of

quoting J.S.

intimate
App.

or

C-33.

The closest Rotary International came to questioning the validity
of the statute was in its petn to the Cal. Sup. Ct., which raised
the ------=
question:
'jDid
Unruh

Act

privileges

abridge

---------of
the
Court
the

First

appurtenant

International

and

its

to

Amendment

the

local

Appeal's apg l
freedom

membership

California

i ~ ion

of

policies

club? ..

of

the

association
of

Blue

Rotary
brf.

4.

Rotary International relies mainly on Japan Line, Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441

u.s.

434 (1979), which states that

~a

state

statute is sustained within the meaning of §1257(2) when a state
court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against
the

contention

grounds. 'j

that

Id., at 441.

such

application

is

invalid

on

federal

But/ , since Rotary International appears

not to have made such a contention, Japan Line does it no good.
If you agree with this analysis,
voting to deny

certiorari.

you may wish to consider

It may be better to let the lower

courts decide more cases under the standards announced in Jaycees

7.

before the Court revisits the issue.
conclude that the Cal.

Ct.

Also, as discussed below, I

App. 's decision did not viol ate the

First Amendment.
B.
the

Does the Unruh Act,

First

Amendment?

distinguished
freedom

of

maintain

Roberts

between

two

constitutionally
Protecting

of

First,

these

concept of 1 iberty. ''

"enter

Jaycees
protected
into

and

relationships ••

intrusion

by

usafeguards

identity that

u.s.,

468

to

human

relationships

States

constitutionally

against

define one's

United

choices

intimate

protected

independently to

v.

types

association.
certain

as applied to Rotary Clubs, violate

at 619.

are

the
the

State.
ability

is central to any

Second,

the Court has

protected the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
expressive
1.

activitie~.

Intimate

uprecisely

I discuss these separately.

association.

identif [ ied]

every

Although

the

consideration

Court

that

may

has

not

underlie

this type of constituti6nal protection,u 468 u.s., at 618, prior
decisions

have

concerned

the

creation

associations among family members.
434

u.S.

374

International,

(1978)
431

(marriage);
u.s.

678

Organization of Foster Families,
and educating children);
u.s. 494

(1977)

E. g.,
Carey

(1977)

v.

(plurality opinion)

maintenance

Zablocki v.

City of

of

Redhail,

Population Services

(childbirth);

431 U.s.

Moore v.

and

816

( 1977

Smith

v.

(raising

East Cleveland,

431

(living with relatives).

At

the other end of the spectrum, the Court recently held that there
is

no

conastitutionally

protected

right

of

association

in

a

8.

commercial

law

partnership

u.s.

Spalding, 467

of

50

Hishon

lawyers.

intimate

associations

associations

among

family

protected association is,
such

King

&

69, 78 (1984).

Roberts states that the constitutional
to

v.

attributes

as

is

not

protection afforded

necessarily

members.

The

Court

smallness,

stated

to

that

a

1

among other things,

relative

confined

'distinguished by

a

high

degree

of

selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation,
and

seclusion

relationship.~

from
468

others

u.s.,

in

critical

aspects

of

the

at 620.

Roberts cites your concurring opinion in Runyon v. McCrary,

u.s.

427

160,

187-189

for

(1976),

the

proposition

that

u[d]etermining the limits of State authority over an individual's
freedom to enter
entails

a

into a

careful

particular association •••

assessment

of

where

that

unavoidably

relationship's

objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most
intimate

to

the

Roberts,

468

u.s.,

u.s.c.

§1981

most

attenuated

at 420.

of

The issue in Runyon was whether 42

(the statute at issue in the St.

case now under consideration)

attachments.~

personal

Francis College

prohibits private commercial non-

sectarian schools from denying admission to students because they
are

black.

You wrote separately to state your view that some

contracts are so personal as to be outside the scope of §1981.
You distinguished a private school that makes a public offer of
admission to all children who meet minimum qualifications from

~a

small

of

kindergarten

personal

or

invitations

music

class,

extended

to

operated
a

on

limited

the

basis

number

of

LFf

9.

preidentified students
§1981,

in

your

view,

Id.,

"
is

whether

The standard under

at 188.
the

contract

is

"part

of

a

commercial relationship offered generally or widely, .. or whether
the

contract

the

"reflect [s]

selectivity

exercised

individual entering into a personal relationship
189.

II

by

an

Id.,

at

Of course, the standard under §1981 may not be the same as

the First Amendment standard, but it does offer helpful guidance.
What follows is an attempt to compare the Jaycees and Rotary
clubs on the basis of "objective indicia" of intimacy.
,..
---..--a. Size.
Local chapters of the Jaycees are "large. ••
u.s.,

at 621.

The Minneapolis and st.

in Roberts had 430
the average

and 400

Paul chapters considered
In contrast,

members respectively.

Rotary Club has only 46

have more than 900 members.

468

A few,

members.

however,

Rotary clubs are supposed to have at

least 20 members, but some have fewer.
b.

Selectivity.

membership
without

other

than

inquiring

candidates

for

Jaycees

age

into

Rotary

leadership role in
...----.-·--

The

and

sex,

and

no

membership

criteria

admitted

backgrounds.

their

Club

imposed

must

a~~~~s

new

In
be

for

members

~ontrast,

active

in

a

that is not already

-----

"'

represented by another member.
Moreover, the non-mandatory by--------·--------~
laws require that candidates be proposed for membership, be
investigated by

two committees

(including a

general

background

check), and be elected by vote of the board of directors if any
member objects to their admission.
c.

Participation

of

women.

Women

affiliated

with

the

Jaycees were permitted to attend various meetings, participate in

10.

selected projects and in social functions,
central

~activities

including

to the decision of many members to associate with one

another...
Rotary

u.s.,

468

club

participate
projects.

at 621.

meetings
to

a

women are permitted to attend some

and

limited

social
extent

functions,
in

some

and

apparently

community

service

In balance, it appears that Rotary clubs are less open

to women than the Jaycees.
d.
regularly

Participation

of

non-members.

Numerous

non-members

participate

in a

substantial

portion of

the Jaycees

activities.
seems

to

Again, the difference between Rotary and the Jaycees
be

one

of

degree:

Rotary

generally open to the public,

club

meetings

are

not

but non-members are permti ted to

attend by invitation, and any member of another local Rotary club
is

entitled

to

attend.

Joint

meetings

with

other

clubs

are

officially discouraged but not forbidden.
I am inclned to think these differences, taken together, are
not

of

--

constitutional

~

dimension.

--........___

Rotary

largely

business

on

standing

community.

Clubs

do

--

have

•.. ' -

significant contacts with non-members.
based

--

in

Although

the
many

Moreover,

community,
Rotary

membership is

particularly

Clubs

do

the

perform a

general background check, my impression is that membership often
is based more on

'jwhat you

do~

than

11

Who you are."

This,

of

course, is precisely the type of organization that women who wish
to advance in the business world would like to join.
Rotarians

are

instructed not

their membership,

to

the very fact

seek

Even though

business advantages

from

that they know other community

leaders on a personal basis may advance their careers.

Moreover,

11.

membership

may

be

a

badge

accept~nce

of

and

status

in

the

community that benefits the members business dealings with nonmembers.

(I am basing these very impressionistic and speculative

remarks on a little knowledge of how the Rotary Club operates in
Orange, Virginia.

In that small community, member ship can be a

significant benefit to a local businessman.)
In sum, I think applying the Unruh Act to Rotary Clubs does
not violate a constitutional right to intimate association.
2. Expressive association.

The Court has recognized

a right to associate with others in order to engage in political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural activities
protected

by

the

First

u.s.

Hardware Co., 458
(1963).
would

Amendment.

886 (1982)

~

E.g.,

NAACP

v.

Claiborne

u.s.

NAACP v. Button, 371

415

In Roberts, the Court considered whether admitting women
impede

activities,

the

Jaycees'

disseminate

incompatible

ability

its

to

views,

or

engage
exclude

ideologies or philosophies.

in

protected

persons

The Jaycees,

with

at both

the national and local levels, have take public positions "on a
variety of diverse

issues.~

u.s.,

468

at 626.

The Jaycees also

engage in "a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising,
and

other

Id.,

at

activities
626-627.

generalizations"
issues

than

contention

men,
that

worthy

The
that

of

Court
women

••

refused
have

and

rejected

denying

women

protected symbolic speech.

First
to

Amendment

protection.

accept

"unsupported

different
as

the

11

views

attenuated

right

to

at

vote

on

various

best"
was

the

itself

The Court further concluded that any

actual abridgement of protected speech was necessary to further a

12.

compelling State interest preventing invidious discrimination in
the distribution of public goods, services, and other advantages.
In

view

of

the

Court's

expressive association claim

analysis

in

Roberts,

is quite weak.

Rotary

Rotary's
clubs

are

forbidden to take any position on political or religious issues.
While

their

community

Amendment protection,
women

would

hinder

service

projects

entitled

to

First

there is no evidence that the admission of
the

Rotary

-----------------------~

clubs

in

-----

- -- --

activites,

are

---

carrying

out

these

or change their basic philosophy or ideology.
Rotary
-~.....____..._..
does suggest that admitting women in California would make Rotary
less accepted in other countries with different attitudes towards
women.

Assuming this is true {the connection seems quite weak),
~ ~

it is necessary to prevent discrimination.

c.
Finally,
persons

Is the Unruh Act unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?
Rotary
';of

contends

common

that

the

Unruh

intelligence must

meaning and differ as to its
Construction Co., 269

u.s.

Act

is

so vague

necessarily

application.~

385, 391 { 1926).

that

guess at

its

Connally v. General
This issue was not

raised until Rotary International filed its petition for reharing
with the Court of Appeal.
for

review

without

to

the

opinion.

Cal.
The

It was raised again in the petition
Sup.

Ct.

Court

Both

obviously

petitions were
should

not

denied

consider

a

constitutional challenge to the language of a state statute when
the

state

court

did

not

have

an opportunity

to

construe

the

statute.
In any event, the Unruh Act seems to be reasonably specific.
The

California

courts

have

adopted

tests

{the

11

business-l ike

r

~
~
~

13.

attributes~

that

and business

provide

guidance

advantages~

to

organizations

they are covered by the Act.
11

tests applied in this case)
determining whether

Neither is the Act susceptible of

Sweeping and improper application."

at 433.

in

NAACP v. Button, 371

It does not apply to private establishments,

u.s.,

and the

definition of private establishment seems within any boundaries
imposed by the First Amendment.

III. CONCLUSION
One aspect of this case that troubles me is my inability to
find a convincing distinction between the Rotary Club and clubs
such as the Metropolitan,
clubs provide
"badge of

11

University,

and Bohemian.

All these

fraternity.. as well as business connections and a

success•~

that may advance their members'

careers.

(A

member of the Metropolitan Club no doubt already is a success in
the world,

but membership can help him to maintain and build on

his position.)

If

11

small businessmen" can be required to open

their societies to women,
and powerful

it seems that men's clubs for the rich

can be required to do the same.

In short,

Rotary

Clubs are sufficiently like very private and exclusive clubs that
it

will

be

difficult

to

draw

a

convincing

constitutional

distinction between them.
I

-

recommend that you vote

certiorari.

to DISMISS the appeal

If you reach the merits,

and DENY

-

I recommend that you vote

to AFFIRM the judgment of the Cal. Ct. App.

(1~
~
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March 31, 1987

To:
From:

Justice Powell
Bob

No. 86-421, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte
We agree that the better ground of decision in this case (if
the Court reaches the merits)
constitutionally

is that local Rotary clubs are not

distinguishable

from

local

Jaycees

chapters.

The Jaycees case also involved the national organization's effort
to revoke the charter of a local chapter that voluntarily admitted women; the Court decided that case by considering the characteristics of the local clubs.
It is true that the only immediate result of the Cal. ct.'s
holding
Club.

is

that

Rotary

International

may not

expel

the

Duarte

Thus the Court might consider only whether Rotary Interna-

tiona!,

an association of clubs,

tection.

(As we discussed,

can claim First Amendment pro-

club~ht

even if a small local

protected by the First Amendment,

is

it is possible that a national

association of local clubs is not protected, because the personal
associations are much less intimate at a national level.)
is clear from re-reading the Cal. ct's opinion that
the

local

Unruh Act.

Rotary clubs and Rotary International

But it

it ~ oth CaLc~

subject to

the

Thus the practical effect of the decision will be to

require all Rotary clubs, at lea·st those in California, to admit
women.

To consider only the privacy

tiona! would "duck" the main issue.

rights of Rotary Interna-

page 2.
I

continue to think that this

is not a proper appeal,

and

that the Court would be unwise to grant cert. so soon after Roberts.

.I
~
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No. 86-421, Board of Directors of Rotary

International, ~

al. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, et al.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether a California statute that
requires California Rotary clubs to admit women members
violates the First Amendment.
I

A

2•

Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit
corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in
Evanston, Illinois.

It is "an organization of business

· and professional men united worldwide, who provide
humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in
all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the
world."

Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 (1981); App. 35.

Individual members belong to a local Rotary club rather
than International.

In turn, each local Rotary club is a

member of International.

Ibid.

In August 1982, shortly

before the trial in this case, International comprised
19,788 Rotary clubs in 157 countries, with a total
membership of about 907,750.

Brief for Appellant 7.

Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary
club according to a "classification system."

The purpose

3.

of this system is to ensure "that each Rotary club
includes a representative of every worthy and recognized
business, professional, or institutional activity in the
· community."
86.

2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 7; App.

Each active member must work in a leadership capacity

in his business or profession.

The general rule is that

"[o]ne active member is admitted for each classification,
but he, in turn, may propose an additional active member,
who must be in the same business or professional
classification."!

\

Id., at 8; App. 86.

Thus each

classification may be represented by two active members.

1

Rotary clubs may establish separate classifications for
subcategories of a business or profession, as long as the
classification "deScribe[s] the member's principal and
recognized professional activity
"
2 Rotary Basic
Library, Club Service 11 (1981); App. 87.
For example, a
single Rotary club may admit a
criminal
lawyer,
a
corporate lawyer, a probate lawyer, and so on.
Ibid.

4.

In addition, "senior active" and ''past service" members

\

may represent the same classification as active members.
See Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31 (1981);
· App. 38-39.

There is no limit to the number of clergymen,

journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to
membership.
Subject to these basic requirements, each local Rotary
club is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for
admitting new members.

Id., at 7; App. 35.

International

has adopted recommended club by-laws providing that
candidates for membership will be considered by both a
"classifications committee" and a "membership committee."
The classifications committee determines whether the
candidate's business or profession is accurately described
and fits an "open" classification.

The membership

5.

committee evaluates the candidate's "character, business
and social standing, and general eligibility."
Appellant 7-8.

Brief for

If any member objects to the candidate's

· admission, the final decision is made by the club's board
of directors.
Membership in Rotary clubs is open only to men.
Standard Rotary Club Constituion, Art. V, Record 97.
Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary
International, testified that the exclusion of women
results in an "aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by
the present male membership," App. to Juris. Statement G52, and also allows Rotary to operate effectively in
foreign countries with varied cultures and social mores.
Although women are not admitted to membership, they are
permitted to attend meetings, give speeches, and receive

6.

awards.

Women relatives of Rotary members may form their

own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary
lapel pin.

Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may

· join Interact or Rotaract, organizations sponsored by
Rotary International.
B

In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California
admitted Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary
Freitag to active membership.

International notified the

Duarte Club that admitting women members is contrary to
the Rotary constitution.

After an internal hearing,

International's board of directors revoked the charter of
the Duarte Club and terminated its membership in Rotary
International.

-The Duarte Club's appeal to the

International Convention was unsuccessful.

7.

The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that

· appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
Cal. Civ. Code §51. 2

Appellees sought to enjoin

International from enforcing its restrictions against
admitting women members,

revoking the Duarte Club's

charter, or compelling delivery of the charter to any
representative of International.

2

Appellees also sought a

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this
state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or
national origin are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations,
advantages,
facilities,
privileges,
or
services
in
all
business
establishments· of any kind whatsoever."
Cal.
Civ. Code §51.

8.

declaration that the appellants' actions had violated the
Unruh Act.

After a bench trial, the court concluded that

neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a
· "business establishment" within the meaning of Unruh Act.
The court recognized that "some individual Rotarians
derive sufficient business advantage from Rotary to
warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax
calculations, or to warrant payment of those expenses by
their employers

"

App. to Juris. Statement B-3.

But

it found that "such business benefits are incidental to
the principal purposes of the association ... to promote
fellowship ... and ...

'service' activities."

Ibid.

The

court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities.

On the basis

of these findings and conclusions, the court entered

9.

judgment for International.
The California Court of Appeal reversed.

It held

that both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club
· are business establishments within the meaning of the
Unruh Act.

For purposes of the Act, a ''business" embraces

"everything about which one can be employed," and an
"establishment" includes "not only a fixed location,

...

but also a permanent 'commercial force or organization' or
a 'permanent settled position (as in life or business).'"
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790,
795, 662 P.2d 427 (1983)

(quoting Burks v. Poppy

Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468-469,
(1962)).

P.2d

The Court of Appeal identified several

"businesslike attributes" of Rotary International,
including its complex structure, large staff and budget,

10.

and extensive

publi~hing

activities.

The court held that

the trial court had erred in finding that the business
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary club
are merely incidental.

It stated that testimony by

members of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business
concerns are a motivating factor in joining local clubs,"
and that "business benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized
upon by Rotarians and their businesses or employers."
App. to Juris. Statement, at C-26.

The Court of Appeal

rejected the trial court's finding that the Duarte Club
does not provide goods, services, or facilities to its
members.

In particular, the court noted that members

receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numerous other
Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and display the
Rotary emblem, and have the opportunity to attend

11.

conferences that teach managerial and professional
techniques.

The court also held that membership in Rotary

International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a
"continuous, personal, and social" relationship that
"take[s) place more or less outside 'public view.'"
Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72,
84, n.14, 707 P.2d 212,

(1985)

(quoting Horowitz, "The

1959 California Equal Rights in 'Business Establishments'
Statute--A Problem in Statutory Application," 33 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 260 , 281, 287, 289 (1960)).

The court further

concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would
not seriously interfere with the objectives of Rotary
International.

Finally, the court rejected appellants'

argument that its policy of excluding women is protected
by the First Amendment principles set out in Roberts v.

12.

United States

Jayce~s,

468 U.S. 609 (1984).

It observed

that "[n]othing we have said prevents, or can prevent,
International from adopting or attempting to enforce
· membership rules or restrictions outside of this state."
App. to Juris. statement C-38.

The court ordered

appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member of
Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them from
enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender requirement
against the Duarte Club.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants'
petition for review.

We postponed consideration of our

jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits.
(1986).

~ and
3 we

u.s.
3

We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction,

'
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

have

appellate

jurisdiction to
review a
final
(Footnote continued)

13.

II
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984), we upheld against First Amendment challenge a
· Minnesota statute that required the Jaycees to admit women
as full voting members.

Roberts provides the framework

for analysis of appellants' constitutional claims.

As we

observed in Roberts, our cases have afforded

(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
judgment entered by the highest court of a State in which
decision could be had "where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of
the United States, and the decision is in favor of its
validity."
28
U.S.C.
§1257(2).
Appellants
squarely
challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as
applied, and the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of
the statute as applied.
"We have held consistently that a
state statute is sustained within the meaning of §1257(2)
when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set
of facts as against the contention that such application
is invalid on federal grounds."
Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441 (1979) (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 u.s. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren
Trading Post v . .Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686, n.1
(1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 61,
n.3 (1963); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257
u.s. 282, 288-290 (1921)).

14.

constitutional

prot~ction

distinct senses.

to freedom of association in two

First, the Court has held that the

Constitution protects against unjustified government
· interference with an individual's choice to enter into and
maintain certain intimate or personal relationships.
Second, the Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to
associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech
or religious activities.

In many cases, government

interference with one form of protected association will
also burden the other form of association.

In Roberts we

concluded that the nature and degree of constitutional
protection are best determined by considering separately
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals'
freedom of personal association and their freedom of
expressive association.

We follow the same course in this

15.

case.
A

The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter
· into and carry on certain

intimateo;:~ationships
1\

is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill

-.-..a.-.tt ~~~ Jo

5u.-.e.A ·
of Rights.

!~~~ relationship ~ may serve to tEansmit ~

Ja
:ta e e .. ~
sAatad ieoals a~lie~,

~
•Re tbaraby te ~ aster

~~

~~
di~rty.

See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431

503-504 (1977)

(plurality opinion).

u.s.

494,

We have not attempted

to mark the precise boundaries of this type of
constitutional protection.

The relationships to which we

have accorded constitutional protection include marriage,
Zablocki v. Radhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the
begetting and bearing of children, Carey v. Population
Services International, 431

u.s.

678, 684-686 (1977);

16.

child rearing and education, Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431

u.s.

816, 844 (1977); and

cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland,
· supra, at 503-504.

ot:~~~
~have
.;\

not held that constitutional

protection is restricted to relationships among family
members.

On the contrary, we have said that the First

Amendment protects those relationships, including family
relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
aspects of one's life."

468

u.s.,

at 619-620.

In Roberts

we observed that "[d]etermining the limits of state
authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a
particular association ... unavoidably entails a careful

17.

assessment of where that relationship's objective
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most
intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments."
· 468 U.S., at 618 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
187-189 (1976)

(POWELL, J., concurring).

whether a particular association is

In determining

sufficiently ....~

to warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors
such as size, purpose, selectivity, congeniality, and
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the
relationship.

!d., at 620.

The evidence in this case indicates that the
relationship among Rotary club members is not the kind of

vr~

intimate relation that warrants constitutional protection.
~

The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20
to more than 900.

App. to Juris. Statement G-15

18.

(deposition of Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of
Rotary International).

There is no upper limit on the

membership of Rotary clubs.

About ten percent of the

· membership of a typical club moves away or drops out
during a typical year.
Service 19, App. 88.

2 Rotary Basic Library, Club
The clubs therefore are instructed

to "keep a flow of prospects coming'' to make up for the
attrition and gradually to enlarge the membership.

Ibid.

The purpose of Rotary "is to produce an inclusive, not
exclusive, membership, making possible the recognition of
all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be
a true cross-section of the business and professional life
of the community."
Rotary 67, App . . 84.

1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on
The membership undertakes a variety

of service projects designed to aid the community, to

19.

improve the standards of the members; businesses and
professions, and to improve international relations.

4

Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on
· diversity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the
members and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind

of

i~

personal relationship that we have accorded

protection under the First Amendment.

To be sure,

membership in Rotary clubs is not open to the general
public.

But each club is instructed to include in its

membership "all fully qualified prospective members
located within its territory," to avoid "arbitrary limits
on the number of members in the club," and to "establish

4 Rotar

clubs in the vicinity of the Duarte Club have
meals
and
transportation
to
the
elderly,
vocational guidance for high . school students, a swimming
program
for
handicapped
children,
and
international
exchange programs, among many other service activities.
provided ~

20.

and maintain a

memb~rship

growth pattern."

Rotary

International, Manual of Procedure 139 (1981); App. 61-62.
Many of the Rotary clubs' central activities are carried
· on in the presence of strangers.

Rotary clubs are

required to admit any member of any other Rotary Club to
their meetings.

Members are encouraged to invite business

associates and competitors to meetings.

At some Rotary

clubs, the visitors number "in the tens and twenties each
week."

App. to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of

Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary
International).

Joint meetings with the members of other

organizations, and other joint activities, are permitted.
The clubs are encouraged to seek coverage of their
meetings and activities in local newspapers.

In sum,

Rotary clubs, rather than carrying on their activities in

21.

an atmosphere of

pr~vacy,

seek to keep their "windows and

doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 69;
App. 85.

We therefore conclude that application of the

· Unruh Act to local Rotary clubs does not interfere unduly
with the members' freedom of ifl ~ e association.

5

B

5Appellants assert that we " pproved" a di
between the Jaycees and the Ki ani s Club in Ro e rts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 630 (1984).
Brief
for Appellants 21.
Appellants
misconstruef
oberts. ~ ~
In that case we observed tha
the Minnesota co rt had
suggested Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the
State's public accommodations aw. We concluded t at this
refuted the Jaycees' argument that the Minnesota statute
was vague and overbroad.
We h'eM ~ ~ cc~oA- t,o consider
whether the relationship amen members of the Kiwanis Club
was
sufficiently
intimat~
to
warrant
constitutional
protection.
Similarly, we have no occasion in this cas;<1~
to consider whether the First Amendment protects the~ igh ~
of individuals to associate in t~ ~b.l¥ s.e le g.t i ve " club
that are found in a a~ . EH:ti e..s throughout the country.
Whether the "zone of privacy" establish~c:l~ )J y~ the First
Amendment extends to a particular club or A~ requires a
careful inquiry into the objective characteristics of the
particular relationshi p;!" at issue.
468 U.S., at 618.
Cf.
Moose Lodge No .. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).

f

I

22.

redress of grievances, and to worship would be of
practical value if citizens could not associate with ea

~

· other for the purpose of carrying on those activities.

~

~ Accordjngly,~e Court~ has recognized that the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment
implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends."
United States Jaycees, 468

u.s.,

at 622.

Roberts v.

See NAACP v.

Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-909, 932-933
(1982).

For this reason, "[i]mpediments to the exercise

of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the
right of association protected by the First Amendment

"

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80, n. 2

23.

(POWELL, J.,

concur~ing)

(citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.

415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958)).

In this case, however, the evidence fails to
~

· demonstrate that the admission of women will
k-.

affect

..,

sigRificantly ~

~ ~.,.__j-- ~ ~ ~
members' ability to carry out their

~~ exi~tin~

o-~
~pressive activities.

"\

As a matter of policy, Rotary clubs do not take
positions on "public questions," including political or
international issues.

Rotary International, Manual of

Procedure 115 (1981), App. 58-59.

To be sure, Rotary

clubs engage in a variety of commendable service
activities that are protected by the First Amendment.

But

the Unruh Act does not require the clubs to abandon or
alter any of these activities.

It does not require them

to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high

24.

ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and peace.
I~

~~J
does
~ require them to abandon

~

~
classification

t~

~

system or admit members who do not reflect a cross - section
· of the community.

Indeed, by opening membership to

leading business and professional women in the community,
Rotary clubs

~~k

obtain a more representative cross -

~

1
section of community leaders. 6

/.9~ ~

~pellants

J ~~women

~ ·~~~J. ~·

nevertheless assert that · admission of

.
.
w1"11 1mpa1r
Ro t ary's e ff ec t"1veness as an

If

~

~~--o.lh.._tk ..,....&.~ 1-L

international organizatio n .' l Appellants' argument i"s

~ ~~~ ~

~~d by the fact that women already attend Rotary clubA

~-~-~~
~~

meetings and participate in many of

u,fA-.t{lle -1- ~

~"

-4
$'"

~
~

activities.

But

~

~~
~

~
~~ {,..-

~~·

6

In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of
the managerial and professional labor force in the United
States. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 400 ( 1986). ~ LAc::~ •. • t9 .,.11-rC ~
EDJ

,u_

1 ,..,..(.

;....

~~

~~ Je6a F~ "ttc.st_

~~~~,,
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to the extent the Unruh Act may be viewed as infringing
Rotary members' right of expressive association, that
~

infringement is necessary to serve the State's compelling
· interest in eliminating discrimination against women.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)
(right of association may be limited

b~

See

(per curiam)
state regulations

necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the
suppression of ideas).

On its face the Unruh Act, like

the Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in
Roberts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the
organization's viewpoint.

Moreover, public accommodations

laws "plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of the
highest order."

468 U.S., at 624.

In Roberts we

recognized that -the state's compelling interest in
assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition

26.

of leadership

skill~

and business contacts as well as

tangible goods and services.

Id., at 626.

We therefore

hold that application of the Unruh Act to California
· Rotary clubs does not violate the right of expressive
£,4..-

assocation afforded bny the First Amendment.
-'\

III
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

We conclude that

these contentions were not properly presented to the state
courts.

It is well settled that this Court will not

review a final judgment of a state court unless "the
record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear
implication that the federal claim was adequately
presented in the state system."
493, 496-497 (1981).

Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S.

Appellants did not present the

27.

issues squarely to the state courts until they filed their
petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal.
court denied the petition without opinion.

The

When "'"the

· highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question,
it will be presumed that the omission was due to want of
proper presentation in the state courts, unless the
aggrieved party can affirmatively show the contrary."'"
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 181 n.3 (1983)
(quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 471
(quoting Street v. New York, 394

U.S. 40, 50, n.11 (1974)

u.s.

576, 582 (1969))).

Appellants have made no such showing in this case. 7

7

Appellants contends that they presented the vagueness
and overbreadth issues in the following portion of their
brief submitted to the Court of Appeal:
"An even more serious potential for vagueness
and overbreadth is that the Unruh Act (unlike
the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited
discrimination to race, color, creed, sex and
other
categories
specifically noted
in
the
statute; rather it prohibits substantially any
(Footnote continued)
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-421

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNATIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY CLUB
OF DUARTE ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[April - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether a California statute that requires
California Rotar:v. ~ubs to admit women members violates
the First Amend~nt.
I
A
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois.
It is "an organization of business and professional men united
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rotar:v.~ub rather than to International. In turn, each local Ro~ tacy ~ub is a member of International. Ibid. In August
1982;'shortly before the trial in this case, International comprised 19,788 Rotary~ubs in 157 countries, with a total
membership of about 007,750. Brief for Appellant 7.
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary~lub
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this
. . . . . system is to ensure "that each Rotary ~ub includes a representative of every worthy and recogn~ed business, professional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose
an additional active member, who must be in the same business or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus,
each classification may be represented by two active members. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" members may represent the same classifications as active members. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV,
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31
(1981), A . 38-39.
"""
ubject to these~equirements, each local Rotary.£).ub
is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admi"ifing
n.-cvv- v \ C\ c-. h , J l new members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has
'""'- 1~-ad6pted recommende<l_~lub ::Ry-laws providing that candidates for membership will be considered by both a "classifications committee" and a "membership committee." The
classifications committee determines whether the candidate's
business or profession is described accurately and fits an
"open" classification. The membership committee evaluates
the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and
general eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any member objects to the candidate's admission, the final decision is
"'-.., made by the ~ub's board of directors.
""-..
Membership in Rotary4 ubs is open only to men. Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna-

"'-v

"

1
Rotary~ubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the member's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary
..::slub may admit a eriminal la~r , a QOrporate lawyep;-a-probatEHawyery

~ .Ibid.
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings,
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Rotary members may form their own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract,
organizations sponsored by Rotary International.
B

In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club
and terminated its membership in Rotary International.
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention
. was unsuccessful.
·
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin International from enforcing its restrictions against admitting
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the
2

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982).

86-421-0PINION
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment"
within the meaning Of) Unruh Act. The court recognized
"
that "some individual Rotarians
derive sufficient business advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris.
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association . . .
to promote fellowship . . . and . . . 'service' activities." Ibid.
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment
for International.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are
business establishments &Yitliin the me ami!~ the Unruh
Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces "everything about which one can be employed," and an "establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, . . . but also a
permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent
settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 427,
430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal.
2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court of
Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary
International, including its complex structure, large staff and
budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court held
that the trial court had erred in finding that the business advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary..c]ub are
merely incidental. It stated that testimony by me"'ffibers of
the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns are
a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "business
benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians and
their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. Statement

5-Jbje.ct
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C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's finding
that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, services, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court noted that
members receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and distt--:-e-nd...,..__ _T M o 'j \
play the Rotary emblem, and <have the opportunitif9YaT.I
conferences that teach managerial and professional techL--L--J
-------=
n=iq:::-u=-=e::::-s~ The court also held that membership in Rotary International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous, personal, and social relationship that take[s] place
more or less outside public view." Id., at C-27 (internal
. quotation marks and citations omitted). The court further
concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would
not seriously interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that
its policy of excluding women is protected by the First
Amendment principles set out in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing
we have said prevents, or can prevent, International from
adopting or attempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside of this state." App. to Juris. Statement
C-38. The court ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte
Club as a member of Rotary International, and permanently
enjoined them from enforcing or attempting to enforce the
gender requirement against the Duarte Club.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction
to the hearing on the merits. - - U. S. - - (1986). We
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S. C. § 1257(2). Appellants
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and
3
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II
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that
required the Jaycees to admit women as full votin member
Roberts provides the framework for anal sis o a ellants'
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that
the Constitution protects against unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or ersona relationships. Second, the
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities. In many cases, government interference with one
form of protected association will also burden the other form
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and degree of constitutional protection by considering separately
} - - --=t=
he;::...;e=.ffect
::.
of thei) challenged state action on individuals' free--(..
dom of personal association and their freedom of expressive
association. We follow the same course in this case.
A

The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
Such relationships may take various forms, including the
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494,
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)).
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to mark the precis oundaries of this type of constitutional
protection. The relationships to which we have accorded
constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, at 503-504. Of course (We have not held that
constitutional protection is restricted to relationshi s amo
rar , we have aid that the
family members. On t e
First Amendment protects those relationships, me u mg
family relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal asoberts v. United States Ja cees
pects of one's life."
supra, at 619-620. /.n Roberts we observed that "[d]etermining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the
most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S., at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U. S. 160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In
determining whether a particular association is sufficiently
- ' - - - - private to warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others
are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship. I d., at
620.
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship
among Rotary 4 ub members is not the kind of intimate or
personal elation that warrants constitutional protection.
e s1ze of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary Interna~

Q__
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There is no upper limit on the membership of{ataAbout ten percent of the membership of a typical
cl~ moves away or drops out during a typical year. 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88. The
clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects
coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge
the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is to
produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be a true cross section of the business and
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library,
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership undertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the
community, to raise the standards of the members' businesses and professions, and to improve international relations. 4 Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on diversity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind ofw~rso~al
relationship to which we have accorded protection under the
""- First Amendment. To be sure, membership in Rotary=:£_lubs
is not open to the general public. But each club is inst:nfcted
to include in its membership "all fully qualified prospective
members located within its territory," to avoid "arbitrary
limits on the number of members in the club," and to "establish and maintain a membership growth pattern." Rotary
/\..\. \.____ !~ternational, Manual of Procedure 139 (1981), App. 61-62.
"--'\\ ~any of the Rotary ~ubs' central activities are carried on in
the presence of str~gers. Rotary ~lubs are required to
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meetings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates
and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary ~ubs, the

J

tiona!).

0).,_--.....,rr.y'T=
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• otary ~lubs in the vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals
and transp'<irtation to the elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among many other service activities.
Record
217H-217J.
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visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App.
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman,
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings
with the members of other organizations, and other joint activities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.
In sum, Rotar~ubs, rather than carrying on their activities
in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows and
doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 69,
App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the
Unruh Act to local Rotary~lubs does not interfere unduly
with the members' freedom of private association. 5
B
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
. c; ll
<""" .,
\
01
-.....,__ ~. ~~~cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468'- ~
~'at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-:-933 (1982). For this reason,
5
Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S.
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Roberts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Minnesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently intimate or private to warrant constitutional pro
· n. Similarly, we hav
no occasion in this case to consider~ the First Amendment protects
the right of individuals to associat'ein-rl(e many clubs and other entities
with selective membership that are found throughout the country.
Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No . 107 v. lrvis,
407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's
associates can violate the right of association protected by
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case,
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary £!ubs will affect in any si nificant way the
existing members'ability to carry out thei
·
"' · · ·
As a matter of policy, Rotary.$Jubs do not ta e pos1 wns on
"public questions," including p~tical or international issues.
Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981), App.
58-59. To be sure, Rota~ubs engage in a variety of commendable service activities That are protected by the First
Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the clubs
to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not require them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a crosssection of the community. · Indeed, by opening membership
to leading business and professional women in the commu·
nity, Rotary.:£J.ubs are likely to obtain
6
cross-section of community leader .
'F6-t,he-extent the URFYH AGt way ae 'viewed as in:ftiH:gmg
Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement is necessary to serve the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of
association may be limited by state regulations necessary to
serve a compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of
• In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the managerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986) .
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ideas). 7 On its face the Unruh Act, like the Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no
distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint.
Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order." 468 U. S., at
624. In Roberts we recognized that the state's compelling
interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as
tangible goods and services. I d., at 626. The Unruh Act
plainly serves this interest. We therefore hold that application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary_clubs does not violate the right of expressive assocation afrorded by the First

Amendment~

r

III

Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts.
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judgment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim
was adequately presented· in the state system." Webb v.
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in
this Court can affirmatively show the contrar ." "' Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181 n. 3 (1983) (quoting

15 1;""'~-\-e.
Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effec+~t- S+-o-t t....
tiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by
(o- \ ;fonA~\ o--·
the act that the 'udgment of the Califon;.~ C~o~u~
rt:...!o~fl,A~p~p~
ea~l~·~~~:::::_----,. 5 {
· ou 1
·
· . See supra, at@ . r Appellants' argument also
is undermined by the fact that women already attend the Rotary~ubs'
meetings and participate in many of
activities.
~
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants
have made no such showing in this case. 8

IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.

8

Appellants contend that they presented the vagueness and overbreadth issues in the fol owing portion of their brief submitted to the Court
of Appeal:
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited discrimination to race, color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among customers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organizations like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.'
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in
Brief for Appellants 36-37).
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness claims. A casual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2).

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-421
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNATIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY CLUB
OF DUARTE ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[April-, 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether a California statute that requires
California Rotary clubs to admit women members violates
the First Amendment.
I
A
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois.
It is "an organization of business and professional men united
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rotary club rather than to International. In turn, each local Rotary club is a member of International. Ibid. In August
1982, shortly before the trial in this case, International comprised 19,788 Rotary clubs in 157 countries, with a total
membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellant 7.
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary club
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this
system is to ensure "that each Rotary club includes a representative of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary

..
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose
an additional active member, who must be in the same business or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus,
each classification may be represented by two active members. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" members may represent the same classifications as active members. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV,
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31
(1981), App. 38-39.
Subject to these basic requirements, each local Rotary club
is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting
new members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has
adopted recommended club by-laws providing that candidates for membership will be considered by both a "classifications committee" and a "membership committee." The
classifications committee determines whether the candidate's
business or profession is described accurately and fits an
"open" classification. The membership committee evaluates
the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and
general eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any member objects to the candidate's admission, the final decision is
made by the club's board of directors.
Membership in Rotary clubs is open only to men. Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna' Rotary clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the member's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary
club may ad~i~dJ
law~~ probateJa.wy~

~· ;
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings,
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Rotary members may form their own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract,
organizations sponsored by Rotary International.
B

In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club
and terminated its membership in Rotary International.
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention
was unsuccessful.
·
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin International from enforcing its restrictions against admitting
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the
2

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982).
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment"
within the meaning of Unruh Act. The court recognized
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris.
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association . . .
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid.
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment
for International.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are
business establishments within the meaning of the Unruh
Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces "everything about which one can be employed," and an "establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, . . . but also a
permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent
settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 427,
430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal.
2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court of
Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary
International, including its complex structure, large staff and
budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court held
that the trial court had erred in finding that the business advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary club are
merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members of
the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns are
a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "business
benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians and
their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. Statement
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C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's finding
that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, services, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court noted that
members receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and display the Rotary emblem, and have the opportunity to attend
conferences that teach managerial and professional techniques. The court also held that membership in Rotary International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous, personal, and social relationship that take[s] place
more or less outside public view." I d., at C-27 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The court further
concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would
not seriously interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that
its policy of excluding women is protected by the First
Amendment principles set out in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing
we have said prevents, or can prevent, International from
adopting or attempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside of this state." App. to Juris. Statement
C-38. The court ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte
Club as a member of Rotary International, and ·permanently
enjoined them from enforcing or attempting to enforce the
gender requirement against the Duarte Club.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction
to the hearing on the merits. - - U. S. - - (1986). We
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S. C.§ 1257(2). Appellants
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and
3

86-421-0PINION
6

BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

II
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld

./

against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members.
Roberts provides the framework for analysis of appellants'
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that
the Constitution protects against unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or personal relationships. Second, the
Court has upheld the free. om of individuals to associate for
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities. In many cases, government interference with one
form of protected association will also burden the other form
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and degree of constitutional protection by considering separately
the effect of t~ challenged state action on individuals' freedom of personal association· and their freedom of expressive
associatiOn. We follow the same course in this case.
A

The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
Such relationships may take various forms, including the
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494,
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)).
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to mark the precise
ndaries of this type of constitutional
protection. The lationships to which we have accorded
constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, at 503-504. Of course we have not held that
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships amon
family member~ \#e have
at the
First Amendment protects those relationships, including
family relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal as~ pects of one's life."
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
supra, at 619-620. t{ffiRoberts we observed that "[d]eter-mining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the
most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S., at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U. S. 160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In
determining whether a particular association is sufficiently
t Lprivate to warrant constitutional protection, we consider facr t.ors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others
are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship. I d., at
620.
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship
among Rotary club members is not the kind of intimate or
personal \ relation that warrants constitutional protection.
The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary Interna-

~
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tional). There is no upper limit on the membership of Rotary clubs. About ten percent of the membership of a typical
club moves away or drops out during a typical year. 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88. The
clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects
coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge
the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is to
produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be a true cross section of the business and
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library,
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership undertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the
community, to raise the standards of the members' businesses and professions, and to improve international relations. 4 Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on diversity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the members
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind o ersonal
relationship to which we have accorded protection under the
First Amendment. To be sure, membership in Rotary clubs
is not open to the general public. But each club is instructed
to include in its membership "all fully qualified prospective
members located within its territory," to avoid "arbitrary
limits on the number of members in the club," and to "establish and· maintain a membership growth pattern." Rotary
International, Manual of Procedure 139 (1981), App. 61-62.
Many of the Rotary clubs' central activities are carried on in
the presence of strangers. Rotary clubs are required to
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meetings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates
and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary clubs, the
• Rotary clubs in the vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals
and transportation to the elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among many other service activities.
Record
2!7H-2!7J.
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visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App.
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman,
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings
with the members of other organizations, and other joint activities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.
In sum, Rotary clubs, rather than carrying on their activities
in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows and
doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library 69,
App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the
Unruh Act to local Rotary clubs does not interfere unduly
with the members' freedom of private association. 5
B
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U. S., at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-:-933 (1982). For this reason,
Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S.
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Roberts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Minnesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, we have
no occasion in this case to consider ~r the First Amendment protects
the right of individuals to associate in the"'many clubs and other entities
with selective membership that are found throughout the country.
Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No . 107 v. lrvis,
407 U.S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5
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"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's
associates can violate the right of association protected by
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case,
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary clubs will affect in any significant way the
existing members' ability to carry out their various~ s.
As a matter of policy, Rotary clubs do not take positions on
"public questions," including political or international issues.
Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981), App.
58-59. To be sure, Rotary clubs engage in a variety of commendable service activities that are protected by the First
Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the clubs
to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not require them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a crosssection of the community. Indeed, by opening me
s ip
to leading business and professional women ·
e community, Rotary clubs are likely to obtain a
e representative
cross-section of community leader 6
~ X'o the extent,lffie Unruh Act may a~s infringing
Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement is necessary-to serve the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of
association may be limited by state regulations necessary to
serve a compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of
In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the managerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986).
6
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ideas). 7 On its face the Unruh Act, like the Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no
distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint.
Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order." 468 U. S., at
624. In Roberts we recognized that the state's compelling
interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as
tangible goods and services. I d., at 626. The Unruh Act
plainly serves this interest. We therefore hold that application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary clubs does not violate the right of expressive assocation afforded by the First
Amendment.
III
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts.
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judgment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim
was adequately presented· in the state system." Webb v.
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in
this Court can affirmatively show the contrary."'" E xxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181 n. 3 (1983) (quoting
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants
have made no such showing in this case. 8
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.

8

Appellants contends that they presented the vagueness and overbreadth issues in the following portion of their brief submitted to the Court
of Appeal:
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited discrimination to race , color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among customers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organizations like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.'
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in
Brief for Appellants 36-37).
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness ·claims. A casual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2).
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 86-421

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNATIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY
CLUB OF DUARTE ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[April - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether a California statute that requires
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates
the First Amendment.
I
A
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois.
It is "an organization of business and professional men united
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rotary Club rather than to International. In turn, each local Rotary Club is a member of International. Ibid. In August
1982, shortly before the trial in this case, International comprised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with a total
membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellant 7.
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this
system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a representative of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose
an additional active member, who must be in the same business or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus,
each classification may be represented by two active members. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" members may represent the same classifications as active members. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV,
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31
(1981), App. 38-39.
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new
members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has promulgated recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates
for membership will be considered by both a "classifications
committee" and a "membership committee." The classifications committee determines whether the candidate's business
or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classification. The membership committee evaluates the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and general
eligibility." Brieffor Appellant 7-8. If any member objects
to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the
Club's board of directors.
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna1
Rotary Clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the member's principal and recognized professional activity . ... " 2 Rotary Basic
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary
Club may admit categories and subcategories of lawyers: e. g., trial, corporate, tax, labor, and so on. Ibid.
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings,
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Rotary members may form their own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract,
organizations sponsored by Rotary International.
B
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club
and terminated its membership in Rotary International.
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention
was unsuccessful.
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin International from enforcing its restrictions against admitting
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the
2

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982).
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment"
within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris.
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association . . .
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid.
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment
for International.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are
business establishments subject to the provisions of the
Unruh Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces
"everything about which one can be employed," and an
"establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, . . . but
also a permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent settled position (as in life or business).'" O'Connor
v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d
427, 430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57
Cal. 2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court
of Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary International, including its complex structure, large staff
and budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court
held that the trial court had erred in finding that the business
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary Club
are merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members
of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns
are a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "business benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians
and their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. State-

86-421-0PINION
BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

5

ment C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's
finding that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, services, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court
noted that members receive copies of the Rotary magazine
and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear
and display the Rotary emblem, and may attend conferences
that teach managerial and professional techniques.
The court also held that membership in Rotary International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous,
personal, and social relationship that take[s] place more or
less outside public view." /d., at C-27 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The court further concluded
that admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously
interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that its policy
of excluding women is protected by the First Amendment
principles set out in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing we have said
prevents, or can prevent, International from adopting or attempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside
of this state." App. to Juris. Statement C-38. The court
ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member
of Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender requirement against the Duarte Club.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction
to the hearing on the merits. - - U. S. - - (1986). We
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
3
We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S. C.§ 1257(2). Appellants
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and
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II
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld

against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members.
Roberts provides the framework for analyzing appellants'
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that
the Constitution protects against unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities. In many cases, government interference with one
form of protected association will also burden the other form
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and degree of constitutional protection by considering separately
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' freedom of private association and their freedom of expressive
association. We follow the same course in this case.
A

The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
Such relationships may take various forms, including the
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494,
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)).
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to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional
protection. The intimate relationships to which we have accorded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, at 503-504. Of course, we have not held that
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among
family members. We have emphasized that the First
Amendment protects th<;>se relationships, including family
relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of
one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at
619-620. But in Roberts we•observed that "[d]etermining
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to
enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate
to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S.,
at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 187-189
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In determining whether a
particular association is sufficiently personal or private to
warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as
size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship. Id., at 620.
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or
private relation that warrants constitutional protection.
The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary International). There is no upper limit on the membership of any
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local Rotary Club. About ten percent of the membership of
a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical year.
2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88.
The clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to
enlarge the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is
to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be a true cross section of the business and
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library,
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership undertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the
community, to raise the standards of the members' businesses and professions, and to improve international relations. 4 Such an inclusive "fellowship for service based on diversity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the members
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind of private
or personal relationship to which we have accorded protection under the First Amendment. To be sure, membership
in Rotary Clubs is not open to the general public. But each
club is instructed to include in its membership "all fully qualified prospective members located within its territory," to
avoid "arbitrary limits on the number of members in the
club," and to "establish and maintain a membership growth
pattern." Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 139
(1981), App. 61-62.
Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on
in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meetings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates
'We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations,
perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to the
elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program
for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among
many other service activities. Record 217H-217J.
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and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary Clubs, the
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App.
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman,
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings
with the members of other organizations, and other joint activities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.
In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows
and doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library
69, App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the
Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly
with the members' freedom of private association. 5
B
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
supra, at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S.
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Roberts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Minnesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, we have
no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First Amendment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs and
other entities with selective membership that are found throughout the
country. Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into
the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
lrvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5
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U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982).
For this reason,
"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's
associates can violate the right of association protected by
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case,
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions
on "public questions," including political or international issues. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981),
App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of
commendable service activities that are protected by the
First Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the
clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not
require them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian
service, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a crosssection of the community. Indeed, by opening membership
to leading business and professional women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representative
cross-section of community leaders with a broadened capacity
for service. 6
Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement
on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement is necessary to serve the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of
association may be limited by state regulations necessary to
serve a compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of
6

In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the managerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986).
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ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like the Minnesota public
accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly serv[e] compelling
state interests of the highest order." 468 U. S., at 624. In
Roberts we recognized that the state's compelling interest in
assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of
leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible
goods and services. ld., at 626. The Unruh Act plainly
serves this interest. We therefore hold that application of
the Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs does not violate
the right of expressive assocation afforded by the First
Amendment. 7
III
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts.
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judgment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim
was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v.
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in
this Court can affirmatively show the contrary."'" Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983) (quoting
7
Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effectiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by
the fact that the legal effect of the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is limited to the State of California. See supra, at 5. Appellants'
argument also is undermined by the fact that women already attend the
Rotary Clubs' meetings and participate in many of its activities.
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants
have made no such showing in this case. 8

IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.

8
Appellants contend that they presented the vagueness and overbreadth issues in the following portion of their brief submitted to the Court
of Appeal:
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited discrimination to race, color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among customers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organizations like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.'
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in
Brief for Appellants 36-37).
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness claims. A casual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-421

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNATIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY
CLUB OF DUARTE ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[April - , 1987]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether a California statute that requires
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates
the First Amendment.
I
A
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois.
It is "an organization of business and professional men united
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7
(1981), App. 35. Individual members belong to a local Rotary Club rather than to International. In turn, each local Rotary Club is a member of International. Ibid. In August
1982, shortly before the trial in this case, International comprised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with a total
membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellant 7.
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this
system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a representative of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary
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Basic Library, Club Service 7 (1981), App. 86. Each active
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or
profession. The general rule is that "[o]ne active member is
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose
an additional active member, who must be in the same business or professional classification." 1 Ibid., App. 86. Thus,
each classification may be represented by two active members. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" members may represent the same classifications as active members. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. IV,
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to
membership. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 31
(1981), App. 38-39.
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new
members. !d., at 7, App. 35. International has promulgated recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates
for membership will be considered by both a "classifications
committee" and a "membership committee." The classifications committee determines whether the candidate's business
or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classification. The membership committee evaluates the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and general
eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any member objects
to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the
Club's board of directors.
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97: Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna' Rotary Clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the member's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic
Library, Club Service 11 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary
Club may admit categories and subcategories of lawyers: e. g., trial, corporate, tax, labor, and so on. Ibid.
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings,
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Rotary members may form their own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract,
organizations sponsored by Rotary International.
B
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club
and terminated its membership in Rotary International.
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention
was unsuccessful.
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin International from enforcing its restrictions against admitting
women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the
2

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities ,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982).
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. Mter a
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment"
within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris.
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association ...
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid.
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment
for International.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are
business establishments subject to the provisions of the
Unruh Act. For purposes of the Act, a "business" embraces
"everything about which one can be employed," and an
"establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, ... but
also a permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor
v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d
427, 430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co ., 57
Cal. 2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court
of Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary International, including its complex structure, large staff
and budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court
held that the trial court had erred in finding that the business
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary Club
are merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members
of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns
are a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "business benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians
and their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. State-

•
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ment C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's
finding that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, services, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court
noted that members receive copies of the Rotary magazine
and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear
and display the Rotary emblem, and may attend conferences
that teach managerial and professional techniques.
The court also held that membership in Rotary International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous,
personal, and social relationship that take[s] place more or
less outside public view." I d., at C-27 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The court further concluded
that admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously
interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that its policy
of excluding women is protected by the First Amendment
principles set out in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U. S. 609' (1984). It observed that "[n]othing we have said
prevents, or can prevent, International from adopting or attempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside
of this state." App. to Juris. Statement C-38. The court
ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member
of Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender requirement against the Duarte Club.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction
to the hearing on the merits. - - U. S. - - (1986). We
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). Appellants
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and
3
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II
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members.
Roberts provides the framework for analyzing appellants'
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that
the Constitution protects against unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities. In many cases, government interference with one
form of protected association will also burden the other form
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and degree of constitutional protection by considering separately
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' freedom of private association and their freedom of expressive
association. We follow the same course in this case.
A
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
Such relationships may take various forms, including the
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494,
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning
of§ 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan , 372 U. S. 58, 61 , n. 3 (1963); DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)).
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to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional
protection. The intimate relationships to which we have accorded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, at 503-504. Of course, we have not held that
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among
family members. We have emphasized that the First
Amendment protects those relationships, including family
relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of
one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at
619-620. But in Roberts we observed that "[d]etermining
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to
enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate
to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S.,
at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 187-189
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In determining whether a
particular association is sufficiently personal or private to
warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as
size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship. I d., at 620.
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or
private relation that warrants constitutional protection.
The size of local Rotary clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary International). There is no upper limit on the membership of any
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local Rotary Club. About ten percent of the membership of
a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical year.
2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 19 (1981), App. 88.
The clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to
enlarge the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is
to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making
possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be a true cross section of the business and
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library,
Focus on Rotary 67 (1981), App. 84. The membership undertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the
community, "to raise the standards of the members' businesses and professions, and to improve international relations. 4 Such ·an inclusive "fellowship for service based on diversity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the members
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind of private
or personal relationship to which we have accorded protection under the First Amendment. To be sure, membership
in Rotary Clubs is not open to the general public. But each
club is instructed to include in its membership "all fully qualified prospective members located within its territory," to
avoid "arbitrary limits on the number of members in the
club," and to "establish and maintain a membership growth
pattern." Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 139
(1981), App. 61-62.
Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on
in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meetings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates
'We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations,
perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to the
elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program
for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among
many other service activities. Record 217H-217J.
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and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary Clubs, the
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App.
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman,
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings
with the members of other organizations, and other joint activities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.
In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows
and doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library
69, App. 85. We therefore conclude that application of the
Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly
with the members' freedom of private association. 5
B
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
supra, at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S.
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Roberts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested
Kiwanis clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations
law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that the Minnesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider whether
the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, we have
no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First Amendment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs and
other entities with selective membership that are found throughout the
country. Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into
the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
lrvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6
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U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982).
For this reason,
"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's
associates can violate the right of association protected by
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case,
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions
on "public questions," including political or international issues. Rotary International, Manual of Procedure 115 (1981),
App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of
commendable service activities that are protected by the
First Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the
clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not
require them to abandon their basic. goals of humanitarian
service, high ethical standards in all vocations, goodwill, and
peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a crosssection of the community. Indeed, by opening membership
to leading business and professional women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representative
cross-section of community leaders with a broadened capacity
for service. 6
Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement
on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement is justifiedJ>ecause i!._~~ the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)
(right of association may be limited by state regulations
necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the
6

In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the managerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986).
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suppression of ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like the
Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's
viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly
serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order." 468
U. S., at 624. In Roberts we recognized that the state's
compelling interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods and services. I d., at 626.
The Unruh Act plainly serves this interest. We therefore
hold that application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary
Clubs does not violate the right of expressive assocation
afforded by the First Amendment. 7

III
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts.
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judgment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim
was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v.
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the
highest court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in
this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.""' Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983) (quoting
7
Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effectiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by
the fact that the legal effect of the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is limited to the State of California. See supra, at 5. Appellants'
argument also is undermined by the fact that women already attend the
Rotary Clubs' meetings and participate in many of its activities.
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Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (quoting
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))). Appellants
have made no such showing in this case. 8
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.

• Appellants contend that they presented the vagueness and overbreadth issues in the following portion of their brief submitted to the Court
of Appeal:
"An even more serious potential for vagueness and overbreadth is that the
Unruh Act (unlike the Minnesota statute) does not limit prohibited discrimination to race, color, creed, sex and other categories specifically noted
in the statute; rather it prohibits substantially any selectivity among customers . . . . [The Act] is a blunt instrument when applied to organizations like Rotary where voluntary fellowship and congeniality are of the
essence. . . . 'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague and broad
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.'
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 435 (1963)." Brief for Respondents in
No. B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26 (brackets in original) (quoted in
Brief for Appellants 36-37).
This cursory reference, occurring in the course of an argument that the
Unruh Act should be applied only to memberships that are a vehicle for
public sale of goods, services or commercial advantages, failed adequately
to present to the state court the overbreadth or vagueness claims. A casual citation to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is
insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim
subject to our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2).
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Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, No. 86-421
Dear Lewis,

~\

I think you have written a fine opinion in this case and my
join memo accompanies this note.
I have only two points which I
hope you will consider. First, I think we lack appellate
jurisdiction. It is true, as you say, th.atrnevalidity of a
st~s been sustained within the meaning of §1257(2) when
the state court holds the statute applicable to a particular set
of facts as against the contention that the application is
invalid on federal grounds.
But it is also true, as Stern and
Gressman note, that "[i]n this context , it is necessary for
appeal purposes that the litigant make specific and plain in the
state court his contention that the application of the statute to
his particular circumstances would make the statute void under
federal law. If he chooses not to phrase his claim in that manner
but argues instead that his f e deral rights prevent application of
the state statute to him , an adverse decision amounts to a denial
of his assertion of federal rights rather than a validation of
the state statute, and review can be had in the Supreme Court
only via certiorari. " See Richmond Newspapers , Inc. v. Virginia ,
448 u. s. 555 , 562-63 n. 4 (1979), and cases cited therein .
The International has continuously argued that the
application of the statute to it would violate its federal
rights, not that the application of the statute to this set of
facts would render the statute void. Although I agree with those
who think these distinctions are semantic games, appellees made
an argument based on this authority , and I feel uncomfortable not
mentioning it.
If no one obj~cts, could we say that it is a
difficult question, - cit lng the cases appellee notes in its Brief,
and simply grant certiorari?
My second concern is with the associational rights of the
International which, I think, is a small preliminary that should
be touched upon before addressing the rights of the Local Clubs.
Would you be willing to agd_ q_J ootnote at the beginning of your
part II (or wherever you think best) making clear that the
International itself has no associational right? For example :
--n--rs~--t1re' Unruh Act mai
constitutionally be applied to Rotary
International.
It is a massive aggregation
of Local Clubs, and plainly cannot lay claim
to any right of intimate association;
moreover, the claim of expressive association

is even weaker here than it was in Roberts.
See infra, at -. We go on, however, to
address the question whether the
associational rights of members of the Local
Rotary Clubs have been violated by the
application of the Act at issue.
Finally, would you consider dropping footnote 8? There
would be circumstances in which I would consider appellants'
presentation sufficient to raise an issue--for example, when such
a showing was made on a question that would support a judgment
below.
Thank you so much for considering my concerns.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

~
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April 30, 1987

86-421, Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary

Club of Duarte

Dear Bill:
Thank you for your 1oin, and for your thoughtful suggestions. I hope I will be able to accommodate you.
1. I originally took the view that we lack appellate
jurisdiction in this case. But my sense is that a majority
at Conference thought appellate jurisdiction is proper.
Moreover, close inspection of the cases cited by Stern &
Gressman does not support their distinction as strongly as I
had thought. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
u.s. 555, 562-563 n.4 (1979), the question was whether the
trial court properly exercised the d iscretlon conferred on
it by the statute. Kulk.o v. CalifornLa Superior Court, 436
u.s. 84, 90 n. 4 (1978), presented a challenge to the state
court's decision to exercise in personam jurisdiction under
a statute that conferred jurisdiction to the limits of the
federal Constitution. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 u.s. 235,
244 (1958), the appellants did not even mention the state
statute until they filed a petition for rehearing with the
Florida Supreme Court.

The earlier cases cited by Stern & Gressman involve
claims of systematic discrimina.tion against the litigant in
the application of a tax statute. In each of these cases,
the constitutionality of the statute itself was not at
issue. Thus I am inclined to think the Court should view
this as a proper appeal. Also, it may not be a good practice to qrant certiorari without deciding whether we have
appellate jurisdiction.
2. I think your second suggestion is an excellent one,
and propose to add the following language in a new footnote
at the end of the first paragraph of Part II:
International, an association of thousands of
local Rotary Clubs, can claim no constitutionally protected right of private association. Moreover, its expressive activities

2.
'

are quite limited. See infra, at 10. Because the Court of Appeal held that the
Duarte Rotary Club also is a business estabU.shment subject to the provisions of the
Unruh Act, we proceed to consider whether
application of the Unruh Act violates the
rights of members of local Rotary Clubs.
3. The purpose of note 8 is to address directly the contention of appellants. I would have some concern about
omitting it altogether. would it help if I revised the note
as follows:
Appellants point to a passage in the brief
they filed in the California Court of Appeal
that quotes th i.s Court's op .in ion in NAACP v.
Button, 371 u.s. 415, 435 (1963): "'It is
enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague
and broad statute lenrls it self to selective
enforcement against unpopular causes.'"
Brief for Respondents in 8001663 (Cal. Court
of Appe.'!l), p. 26 (brackets in original)
(quoted in Brief for Appellants 36-37). The
quotation occurs in the course of an argument
that the Unruh Act should be applied only to
memberships tn entities that are a vehicle
for the public sale of goods, services, or
commercial advantages. This casual reference
to a f(~deral case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is insufficient to inform a
state court that it has been presented with a
clatm subject to our appellate jurisdiction
under 28 u.s.c. §1257(2).
Sincerely,

Just ice Brennan
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR.

May 1, 1987

Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, No. 86-421

Dear Lewis,

Thank you for your responses to my suggestions; I appreciate
your accommodations.
I will give way gracefully on the appellate
jurisdiction question.

Justice Powell

.i~rtmt
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CHAMBERS OF

J U S T IC E ANTONIN SCALI A

May 1, 1987
Re:

No. 86-421 -

Rotary Int'1 v. Rotary Club of Duarte

Dear Lewis,
Although I agree with the result reached in your
opinion, my analysis of the case is sufficiently different that I
am unable to join.
In light of the press of business, I think it
best if I simply concur in the judgment.
I would appreciate it
if you would indicate my concurrence at the end of your opinion.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
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Justice Powell
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-421

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNATIONAL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. ROTARY
CLUB OF DUARTE ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[May 4, 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide whether a California statute that requires
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates
the First Amendment.
I

A
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois.
It is "an organization of business and professional men united
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage
high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7
(1981) (hereinafter Manual), App. 35. Individual members
belong to a local Rotary Club rather than to International.
In turn, each local Rotary Club is a member of International.
Ibid. In August 1982, shortly before the trial in this case,
International comprised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with a total membership of about 907,750. Brief for
Appellant 7.
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this
system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a representative of every worthy and recognized business, profes-
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sional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary
Basic Library, Club Service 67-69, App. 86. Each active
member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or
profession. The general rule is that "one active member is
admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose
an additional active member, who must be in the same business or professional classification." 1 I d., p. 7, App. 86.
Thus, each classification may be represented by two active
members. In addition, "senior active" and "past service"
members may represent the same classifications as active
members. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V,
§§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the number of
clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to
membership. Manual 31, 33, App. 38-39.
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new
members. I d., at 7, App. 35. International has promulgated Recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates
for membership will be considered by both a "classifications
committee" and a "membership committee." The classifications committee determines whether the candidate's business
or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classification. The membership committee evaluates the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and general
eligibility." Brief for Appellant 7-8. If any member objects
to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the
club's board of directors.
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna' Rotary Clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of
a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the member's principal and recognized professional activity .... " 2 Rotary Basic
Library, Club Service 8 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary
Club may admit categories and subcategories of lawyers: e. g., trial, corporate, tax, labor, and so on. Ibid.

t
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tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings,
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of
Rotary members may form their own associations, and are
authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women
between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or
Rotaract, organizations sponsored by Rotary International.

B
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California admitted
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club
and terminated its membership in Rotary International.
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention
was unsuccessful.
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982). 2 Appellees sought to enjoin
International from enforcing its restrictions against admitting women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that the
2

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 1982).

86-421-0PINION
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appellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a
bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment"
within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized
that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business
advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of
those expenses by their employers .... " App. to Juris.
Statement B-3. But it found that "such business benefits
are incidental to the principal purposes of the association ...
to promote fellowship ... and ... 'service' activities." Ibid.
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment
for International.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that
both Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are
business establishments subject to the provisions of the
Unruh Act. For purposes of the Act, a "'business' embraces
everything about which one can be employed," and an "establishment" includes "not only a fixed location, ... but also a
permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a 'permanent
settled position (as in life or business)."' O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 427,
430 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal.
2d 463, 468-469, 370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court of
Appeal identified several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary
International, including its complex structure, large staff and
budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court held
that the trial court had erred in finding that the business
advantages afforded by membership in a local Rotary Club
are merely incidental. It stated that testimony by members
of the Duarte Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns
are a motivating factor in joining local clubs," and that "business benefits [are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians
and their businesses or employers." App. to Juris. State-
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ment C-26. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's
finding that the Duarte Club does not provide goods, services, or facilities to its members. In particular, the court
noted that members receive copies of the Rotary magazine
and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear
and display the Rotary emblem, and may attend conferences
that teach managerial and professional techniques.
The court also held that membership in Rotary International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous,
personal, and social" relationship that "take[s] place more or
less outside public view." I d., at C-27 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The court further concluded
that admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously
interfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that its policy
of excluding women is protected by the First Amendment
principles set out in Robe1-ts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U. S. 609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing we have said
prevents, or can prevent, International from adopting or attempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside
of this state." App. to Juris. Statement C-38. The court
ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a member
of Rotary International, and permanently enjoined them
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender requirement against the Duarte Club.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction
to the hearing on the merits. 479 U. S. - - (1986). We
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, 3 and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
3

We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). Appellants
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and
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II

In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members.
Roberts provides the framework for analyzing appellants'
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that
the Constitution protects against unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities. In many cases, government interference with one
form of protected association will also burden the other form
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and degree of constitutional protection by considering separately
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' freedom of private association and their freedom of expressive
association. We follow the same course in this case.~
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning
of § 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of
acts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); WaTren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax· Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)).
'International, an association of thousands of local Rotary Clubs, can
claim no constitutionally protected right of private association. Moreover.
its expressive activities are quite limited. · See, i11jra, at 10. Because the
Court of Appeal held that the Duarte Rotary Club also is a business establishment subject to the provisions of the Unruh Act, we proceed to consider whether application of the Unruh Act violates the rights of members
of local Rotary Clubs.
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A
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
Such relationships may take various forms, including the
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494,
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted
to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional
protection. The intimate relationships to which we have accorded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting and
bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535
(1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, at 503-504. Of course, we have not held that
constitutional protection is restricted to relationships
among family members. We have emphasized that the First
Amendment protects those relationships, including family
relationships , that presuppose "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts , experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of
one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at
619-620. But in RobeTis we observed that "[d]etermining
the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to
enter into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate
to the most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U . S.,
at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 187-189
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring)). In determining whether a
particular association is sufficiently personal or private to
warrant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as
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size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship. 468 U. S., at 620.
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or
private relation that warrants constitutional protection.
The size of local Rotary Clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to
more than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of
Herbert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary International). There is no upper limit on the membership of any
local Rotary Club. About ten percent of the membership of
a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical year.
2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 9-11, App. 88. The
clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects
coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge
the membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be a true cross section of the business and
professional life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library,
Focus on Rotary 60-61, App. 84. The membership undertakes a variety of service projects designed to aid the community, to raise the standards of the members' businesses and
professions, and to improve international relations. 5 Such
an inclusive "fellowship for service based on diversity of interest," ibid., however beneficial to the members and to
those they serve, does not suggest the kind of private or personal relationship to which we have accorded protection
under the First Amendment. To be sure, membership in
Rotary Clubs is not open to the general public. But each
club is instructed to include in its membership "all fully quali• We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations ,
perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to the
elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program
for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among
many other service activities. Record 217H-217J.
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fled prospective members located within its territory," to
avoid "arbitrary limits on the number of members in the
club," and to "establish and maintain a membership growth
pattern." Manual 139, App. 61-62.
Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on
in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meetings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates
and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary Clubs, the
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App.
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman,
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings
with the members of other organizations, and other joint activities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.
In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows
and doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library,
Focus on Rotary 60-61, App. 85. We therefore conclude
that application of the Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does
not interfere unduly with the members' freedom of private
association. 6
6
Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the
Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U. S. 609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue
Roberts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested Kiwanis Clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommodations Jaw. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments
that the Minnesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider
whether the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was sufficiently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly,
we have no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs
and other entities with selective membership that are found throughout
the country. Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First
Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful inquiry into the objective characterjstics of the particular relationships at
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B
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
supra, at 622. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982). For this reason,
"[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's
associates can violate the right of association protected by
the First Amendment .... " Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case,
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions
on "public questions," including political or international
issues. Manual115, App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary Clubs
engage in a variety of commendable service activities that
are protected by the First Amendment. But the Unruh Act
does not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these
activities. It does not require them to abandon their basic
goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all
vocations, goodwill, and peace. Nor does it require them to
abandon their classification system or admit members who do
not reflect a cross-section of the community. Indeed, by
opening membership to leading business and professional
women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a
more representative cross-section of community leaders with
a broadened capacity for service. 7
issue. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
' In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the managerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986).
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Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement
on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that
infringement is justified because it serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)
(right of association may be limited by state regulations
necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the
suppression of ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like the
Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in Roberts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's
viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly
serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order." 468
U. S., at 624. In Roberts we recognized that the State's
compelling interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods and services. I d., at 626.
The Unruh Act plainly serves this interest. We therefore
hold that application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary
Clubs does not violate the right of · expressive association
afforded by the First Amendment. ~

III
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts.
It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judgment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim
was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v.
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The
' Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effectiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by
the fact that the legal effect of the judgment of the California Court of
Appeal is limited to the State of California. See supra, at 5. Appellants'
argument also is undermined by the fact that women already attend the
Rotary Clubs' meetings and participate in many of its activities.
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court denied the petition without opinion. When "'"the
highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question,
it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of
proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved
party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.""'
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983)
(quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974)
(quoting Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))).
Appellants have made no such showing in this case. 9
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JuSTICE SCALIA concurs in the judgment.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part
· in the decision or consideration of this case.

Appellants point to a passage in the brief they filed in the California
Court
of Appeal that quotes this Court's opinion in NAACP v. Bntton, 371
1
' U. S. 415, 435 (1963): '"It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague
and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular
causes.'" Brief for Respondents in B001663 (Cal. Court of Appeal), p. 26
(brackets in original) (quoted in Brief of Appellants 37-37). The quotation
occurs in the course of an argument that the Unruh Act should be applied
only to memberships in entities that are a vehicle for the public sale of
goods, services, or commercial advantages. This casual reference to a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is insufficient to inform a
state court that it has been presented with a claim subject to our appellate
, jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C § 1257(2).
9
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We concluded that our 1984 decision in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees/ is a controlling precedent.
JUSTICE SCALIA concurs in the judgment.
JUSTICE BLACMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part
in the decision or consideration of this case.
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Hon. Lewis F. Powell
Associate Justice United States Supreme Court
Washington, D.C.
Dear Lewis:
I would not be true to myself or Rotary, in which I have been
a member for sixty years, if I did not tell you how disappointed I am
at the Court ' s decision against Rotary International. In my judgment
the Court was wrong.
Over a periof of eighty two years Rotary has successfully maintained its growing membership with its constitution and by laws including the word male only. Women as members of Rotary will be insignificant.
They have a number of women 1 s clubs and that is where they belong.
Speaking for the Court I feel that your remarks are rather
ambiguous. Discrimination, the most overworked word today cannot be
applied to RotarY for Rotary does not inquire into color, creed, race,
political or rellgious persuasion. Rotarians have their wives with tnem
at district conferences, International Conventions and Valentine and
.
Christmas parties.
I note that Justice Blackman who is an Honorary Rotarian and
Justice 0 1 Connor whose husband is an Honorary Rotarian did not take
part in the ruling. One wonders if your Honorary Membership in the
Rotary Club of Richmond is less recognized.
It ' s a sad day in jurisprudence when a service club is told
who its members may be.
Sincerely

May 14, 1987

PERSONAL

Dear Claude:
Thank you for your thoughtful letter
about the Court's decision in Board of Directors
of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte.
I enclose a copy of the Court unanimous
opinion that may clarify for you what the Court
decided.
Although the decision itself relates
only to the state of California, its reasoning
will be viewed as applying generally. We simply
followed Roberts v. United States Jaycees that was
the controlling precedent.
You will note that the Court spoke highly
of the public service rendered by Rotary Clubs,
and expressed the view that professional and business women can make important contributions to
these services.
You mentioned that I had been made an
honorary member of Richmond Rotary when I went on
the Court 15 years ago.
I appreciated the honor
conferred on me, but as Ben Sheppard will recall,
I advised him I could not take anv part in the
activities of the Club.
Indeed, I believe I attended only one meeting some years ago when I was
invited to speak.
As you noted, two Justices disqualified
themselves. One had been an active member for
many years and, I believe, is a former club president.
The spouse of another Justice also is or
has been an active member.
It was believed neces-
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sary for those of us who had never been active
members to sit on the case to assure a quorum.
I write this letter to you personally,
with a copy to Ben, because of our long friendship
and my concern that you not misunderstand. This
letter is not for publication, nor should it be
read to the membership of Rotary. Normally Justices make no explanation of their decisions.
I will add this.
I can understand your
initial adverse reaction because I felt the same
way when my college, Washington and Lee University, went coed.
Yet, the result has been positive
in every respect. Not only has the total number
of qualified applications for admission increased
substantially, but even trustees and faculty members who opposed W&L going coed now believe that
it has substantially improved the educational
quality of the student body.
I send best wishes to you and Ben.
Sincerely,

Hon. Claude w. Woodward
1211 Confederate Avenue
Richmond, Virginia 23227
lfp/ss
cc:

Dr. L. Benjamin Sheppard

